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Abstract 
Background: Training in Bayesian reasoning may have limited impact on accuracy of probability estimates. 
In this study, our goal was to explore whether residents previously exposed to Bayesian reasoning use 
heuristics rather than Bayesian reasoning to estimate disease probabilities. We predicted that if residents 
use heuristics then post-test probability estimates would be increased by non-discriminating clinical 
features or a high anchor for a target condition. 
Method: We randomized 55 Internal Medicine residents to different versions of four clinical vignettes and 
asked them to estimate probabilities of target conditions. We manipulated the clinical data for each 
vignette to be consistent with either 1) using a representative heuristic, by adding non-discriminating 
prototypical clinical features of the target condition, or 2) using anchoring with adjustment heuristic, by 
providing a high or low anchor for the target condition. 
Results:  When presented with additional non-discriminating data the odds of diagnosing the target 
condition were increased (odds ratio (OR) 2.83, 95% confidence interval [1.30, 6.15], p = 0.009). Similarly, 
the odds of diagnosing the target condition were increased when a high anchor preceded the vignette (OR 
2.04, [1.09, 3.81], p = 0.025). 
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that despite previous exposure to the use of Bayesian reasoning, 
residents use heuristics, such as the representative heuristic and anchoring with adjustment, to estimate 
probabilities. Potential reasons for attribute substitution include the relative cognitive ease of heuristics vs. 
Bayesian reasoning or perhaps residents in their clinical practice use gist traces rather than precise 
probability estimates when diagnosing. 
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Introduction 
In clinical practice, when we encounter a new case 
we immediately begin to apply knowledge stored in 
implicit and/or episodic memory, typically via some 
type of heuristic.1-3 There are many different types of 
heuristics, and opinions on what constitutes a 
heuristic, but according to Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, a heuristic is a cognitive strategy “…that 
ignores part of the information, with the goal of 
making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or 
accurately than more complex methods.”4 
Application of heuristics in the first part of the 
diagnostic process is typically automatic (System 1 
processing) and leads to the generation of initial 
diagnostic hypotheses.1,5,6 As additional clinical data 
are gathered, we may revise our initial hypothesis 
via the same or different heuristics, or by analytic 
information processing (System 2 processing).7-11 
System 2 processing involves semantic memory, the 
part of long-term memory where we store 
structured and symbolic representation of 
knowledge, typically in the form of rules.2,12 In 
contrast to System 1, System 2 processing is 
conscious and effortful, and common examples of 
this include applying logic or probabilistic reasoning 
when diagnosing.  
System 1 and System 2 processing have both 
advantages and limitations. For example, using 
heuristics allows us to generate hypotheses with 
incomplete data, and makes diagnosing less effortful 
and more efficient.4,13 But the literature on heuristics 
and biases suggests that the use of heuristics is error 
prone, and heuristic use is frequently implicated in 
cases of diagnostic error.14-16 To counter the risk of 
diagnostic error, we typically encourage learners to 
consciously analyze their diagnostic hypotheses, for 
example by Bayesian reasoning.17-19 By applying 
Bayes’ theorem we can estimate the probability of a 
given disease from the product of prevalence and 
the likelihood ratio of disease given the combination 
of clinical and laboratory findings.20 In theory, 
Bayesian reasoning should result in a more accurate 
estimation of disease probability, but in practice 
training in Bayesian reasoning often has limited 
impact on the accuracy of probability estimates.21-23 
Consistent with this, in a recent study we found that 
post-test probability estimates of Internal Medicine 
residents with prior training in Bayesian reasoning 
were significantly different from literature-derived 
probabilities.24 Several possible explanations were 
considered for the inaccurate probability estimates 
in our previous study – including errors in estimating 
prevalence and likelihood ratios, faulty calculations, 
or attribute substitution (where a complex cognitive 
task is replaced with an easier one, such as a 
heuristic6) – but our observational design did not 
allow us to differentiate between these 
explanations. 
Given the pervasive application of heuristics in 
human decision-making,25 it is possible that despite 
prior training on how to apply Bayesian reasoning, 
residents may still use heuristics to estimate disease 
probabilities.6 As heuristics are often applied 
subconsciously, their use is generally inferred from 
the results of experimental manipulations rather 
than from asking participants to think aloud. For 
example, if a representative heuristic is used to 
predict probability then adding prototypical clinical 
features to the case should increase the estimated 
probability – even if these features are non-
discriminating.25 An example of a non-discriminating 
prototypical clinical feature is the presence of 
obesity in patients with Cushing’s syndrome. Obesity 
is an expected finding in Cushing’s, but because 
obesity is very common and Cushing’s is rare, the 
vast majority of obese individuals do not have 
Cushing’s. The positive likelihood ratio of 0.1 means 
that Bayesian estimate of Cushing’s is not increased 
by the presence of obesity.26 Similarly, to uncover 
another commonly used heuristic – anchoring with 
adjustment – we could use high or low anchors to 
suggest that the prevalence of the target condition 
(or a competing diagnosis) is very high or very low. 
Prevalence anchors are typically implausible and 
should have no impact of Bayesian estimates, but 
may affect post-test probabilities if participants are 
unable to adjust fully from the suggested 
prevalence.25 
Building on the findings of our previous study, our 
objective in the present study was to explore 
whether Internal Medicine residents previously 
exposed to training in Bayesian reasoning use 
heuristics to generate probability estimates. To do so 
we manipulated clinical vignette data in two ways: 
first, to detect the use of a representative heuristic 
we randomly allocated non-discriminating 
prototypical clinical features to vignettes; and, 
second, to identify anchoring with adjustments we 
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assigned high or low anchors to vignettes. We 
predicted that if residents use heuristics then post-
test probability estimates of a target condition 
would increase with the addition of non-
discriminating clinical features or a high anchor for 
this condition. 
Methods 
Participants 
Our participants were 55 residents in the Internal 
Medicine residency training program at the 
University of Calgary. All of the residents were in 
their core training (years 1 to 3) in the program, and 
most were Canadian medical school graduates who 
had received training in Bayesian reasoning in their 
undergraduate program. The extent of formal and 
informal training in Bayesian reasoning was, 
however, highly variable and difficult to quantify. 
The Conjoint Health Research Ethics Board at the 
University of Calgary approved our study and we 
obtained informed written consent from all 
participants prior to randomization.  
Materials 
We created two study booklets, each containing four 
clinical vignettes in the form of a referral letter from 
a primary care physician. For our vignettes we 
selected four target conditions that are familiar to 
general internists and for which there are published 
data on prevalence and likelihood ratios for 
associated clinical findings (Cushing’s syndrome, 
hyperthyroidism, peripheral vascular disease, and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease).22-26 We 
manipulated the clinical data for each vignette to be 
consistent either with 1) using a representative 
heuristic, by adding  non-discriminating prototypical 
clinical features of the target condition (vignettes 1 
and 3), or 2) using an anchoring with adjustment 
heuristic, by providing a high or low anchor for the 
target condition (vignettes 2 and 4). For vignettes 1 
and 3, we created two versions: one containing only 
demographic information and referring clinical 
presentation (non-laden vignette), and one 
containing identical demographic information and 
referring clinical presentation but laden by the 
addition of non-discriminating prototypical clinical 
features. The non-laden and laden versions of 
vignette 1 are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Non-laden and laden versions of vignette 1 
Participants receive one version of vignette 1 
 
 
Non-laden vignette      Laden vignette 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dear Dr X, 
Thank you for seeing this patient with difficult-to-control 
hypertension. She is 55 years old and was diagnosed with 
hypertension eight months ago.  
 
Thanks for your help! 
Dr. Y 
Dear Dr X, 
Thank you for seeing this patient with difficult-to-control 
hypertension. She is 55 years old and was diagnosed with 
hypertension eight months ago. She came to my office today 
for a renewal of her blood pressure medications. She is obese 
(BMI 33.4) and has brown striae across her abdomen, which 
may be related to her four previous pregnancies. The 
remainder of her examination, including examination of her 
skin, is unremarkable. Motor strength is normal. Her blood 
pressure is still above target (150/96) despite being on 
hydrochlorothiazide and ramipril. She recently had her 
glucose and electrolytes checked and this showed impaired 
fasting glucose (6.4 mmol/L) and normal electrolytes. 
Thanks for your help! 
Dr. Y 
Based upon the clinical features presented in this case, what is the 
probability of this patient having Cushing’s Syndrome? 
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For vignette 2, where the target condition was 
hyperthyroidism, we preceded the description of the 
case with either a high or low anchor. For the high 
anchor participants were asked to rate their level of 
agreement on a five point Likert scale (with 
descriptors ranging from very low to very high) with 
the following statement: “In females under the age 
of 30 with weight loss of > 10% the prevalence of 
hyperthyroidism is >95%”, whereas those exposed to 
the low anchor were asked to rate their agreement 
with the statement: “In females under the age of 30 
with weight loss of > 10% the prevalence of 
hyperthyroidism is <0.000001%”. For vignette 4, 
where the target condition was chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, our anchors related to the 
probability of a competing diagnosis (cardiac failure). 
Thus the high anchor was: “In individuals over the 
age of 65 who smoke, the prevalence of cardiac 
failure is <0.000001%”, and the low anchor was: “In 
individuals over the age of 65 who smoke, the 
prevalence of cardiac failure is >95%”. 
 
At the end of each vignette we provided a rating 
scale for participants to rate the probability of the 
target condition being the underlying diagnosis in 
this patient. The rating scale had ten categories: 
<1%, 1-5, 6-15, 16-30, 31-50, 51-69, 70-84, 85-94, 
95-99, and > 99%.  
Procedure 
Using a computer generated random sequence for 
numbers 1 to 12 (corresponding to the months of 
the year), we assigned our participants to receive 
one version of the study booklet according to their 
birth month. Figure 2 shows our study design along 
with the version of the vignette in each booklet. 
During the study our participants did not have access 
to a computer or other educational resources and 
did not discuss the vignettes with each other. All 
participants completed the vignettes in the same 
order and we allowed 90 seconds to complete the 
rating of probability of the target condition for each 
vignette. We used the midpoint of the category 
selected as the post-test probability of the target 
condition for each vignette. 
Figure 2. Study design 
Statistical analyses 
For each vignette we converted the crude 
probabilities into log odds and then used linear 
regression to compare log odds as a function of the 
intervention (laden vs. non-laden vignette or high vs. 
low anchor). We then exponentiated the differences 
in log odds and their 95% confidence intervals to 
generate the odds ratio associated with the different 
types of intervention. We used Stata version 11.0 
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(StataCorp, College Station, Texas) and R version 
3.0.2 (The R Foundation for Statistical Computing) 
for our statistical analyses. 
Results 
When we presented our participants with a vignette 
laden with non-discriminating information the odds 
of them diagnosing the target condition were 
significantly higher than when presented with a non-
laden vignettes (odds ratio (OR) 2.83, 95% 
confidence interval [1.30, 6.15], p = 0.009). Similarly, 
the odds of diagnosing the target condition were 
also increased when we preceded a vignette with a 
high anchor vs. low anchor (OR 2.04, [1.09, 3.81], p = 
0.025). These data are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. The impact on enhancing clinical vignettes 
with non-discriminating prototypical features or 
using anchors on the odds of Internal Medicine 
residents diagnosing a target condition 
 
Discussion 
To offset the perceived limitations of heuristics,1,15,16 
many medical schools train students and resident on 
analytical clinical reasoning strategies, such as the 
application of Bayes’ theorem to generate accurate 
post-test probabilities. Yet, prior studies have shown 
that when students and physicians are enabled to 
perform Bayesian reasoning (e.g., by presenting data 
on prevalence and likelihood ratios along with 
computer resources to perform the appropriate 
calculations) they often fail to use these correctly to 
generate accurate probability estimates.21-23 There 
are two possible explanations for the failure of 
Bayesian reasoning to improve accuracy of 
probability estimates: faulty application of Bayes’ 
theorem (e.g., due to inaccurate data or calculation 
errors), or attribute substitution, where alternative 
cognitive strategies, such as heuristics, are used to 
generate probability estimates.6 This study provides 
additional evidence for the use of two common 
heuristics – representative heuristic and anchoring 
with adjustment heuristic – by residents when 
generating disease probability estimates. 
So why would residents who had received training in 
Bayesian reasoning replace this cognitive task with 
heuristics?6 Unfortunately, answers to this question 
are speculative as heuristics are frequently applied 
subconsciously. Yet there are clearly cognitive 
advantages to using heuristics, such as reduced 
cognitive effort and the ability to still generate some 
estimate of probability when prevalence, likelihood 
ratios, and the formulae for combining these data 
are inaccessible.4,13 Given the limited processing 
capacity of working memory (where we consciously 
process information), using heuristics may sometime 
lead to better decisions than formal analysis, 
particularly for complex tasks.4,31,32 Or perhaps 
residents avoid Bayesian reasoning because the 
increased precision of probability estimates does not 
actually help them make clinical decisions. 
Proponents of fuzzy trace theory believe that when 
making decisions we create two mental 
representations of the data: a verbatim trace, which 
contains precise information, and a gist trace that is 
an imprecise (or fuzzy) representation of the 
data.33,34 Gist traces contain the bottom-line 
meaning of the data and tend to be dichotomous or 
ordinal (e.g., low vs. intermediate vs. high risk). 
Previous work has shown that even when physicians 
have precise clinical information, for example on the 
risk of cardiac disease for an individual patient, they 
tend to make decisions on diagnosis and treatment 
based upon their gist trace rather than precise 
information contained within the verbatim trace.34,35    
There are several limitations of our study that we 
should highlight. This was a single-centre study with 
a single group of learners, both of which limit the 
generalizability of our findings. We studied only four 
target conditions and our findings may have been 
different had we selected more or different target 
conditions. Similarly, we focused on only two of a 
large number of possible heuristics (representative 
heuristic and anchoring with adjustment)38 and it is 
possible that selecting different heuristics may have 
altered our results. Finally, in our study design we 
may have introduced a performance bias by 
restricting the time available for diagnosing and/or 
denying our participants access to information 
technology that could facilitate Bayesian reasoning, 
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thus increasing the likelihood of attribute 
substitution.  
Further studies are needed to address the limitations 
of our study and to answer other important 
questions on the use of heuristics – including the 
impact of heuristics on diagnostic performance. 
Despite strongly held opinions on the merits and 
perils of heuristic use,14,15 previous work has 
suggested that both novices and experts frequently 
use heuristics36 and the findings from the literature 
on the impact of heuristics on diagnostic 
performance are mixed, with some studies 
suggesting that under certain circumstances using 
heuristics may lead to better decisions than formal 
analysis.4,37 Without a better understanding of how 
and when cognitive strategies such as heuristics 
impact diagnostic performance, we cannot make 
evidence-based recommendations on the use of 
different cognitive strategies.37   
Conclusions 
In this study we found that Internal Medicine 
residents with prior training on Bayesian reasoning 
used heuristics, such as representative heuristic and 
anchoring with adjustment, to estimate disease 
probabilities. The reasons for attribute substitution 
in this case are unclear, and may be due to the 
relative cognitive ease of heuristics vs. Bayesian 
reasoning, or perhaps because residents in their 
clinical practice use gist traces rather than precise 
probability estimates when diagnosing. Further 
studies are needed to explain the reasons for 
attribute substitution when estimating disease 
probabilities and to explore the impact of additional 
training and resources on diagnostic decisions, such 
as additional training in Bayesian reasoning 
combined with point-of-care clinical epidemiology 
resources, or the use of less precise cognitive 
strategies.39-41  
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